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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001-2006

MEMO: []

18 Nov. 1945

SUBJECT: "Die Deutsche Situation"

1. I had this read by, and discussed it with, [] J. He stated that it took some time to separate the meat from the very flowery style and the wordy embellishments.

2. The writer of the article is revealed as Chief of Psychological Warfare of the Waffen-SS; currently, he states, collaborating with "a certain office of the American Army of Occupation in Germany." He states it as the goal of this collaboration to evaluate the experiences of German Psychological Warfare, its successes and failures, in view of the common enemy of the US and Germany. He proposes that, based upon his research, a course of action should be charted. He addresses himself to General Mademeyer because he has found it extremely difficult high and responsible US offices capable of taking authoritative action.

3. His most important points are:

- a. The Russians feel themselves at home in Germany where they support and in fact control a communist government; they have, in fact, invented their own brand of German nationalism and have forced a concept of German nationalism upon the Americans who are suspicious of the growth of nationalism in Western Germany. American propaganda is fluid, innocuous and inconsistent and badly needs a psychological line of departure from the Russian line, but equal in appeal and effect.
- b. He suggests that basic ideologies for non-partisan nationalism must be developed and expounded, ideologies so powerful that none of the new national parties, groups, media, etc., could afford to deviate.
- c. The creation of these "Grundthesen" is necessary because Nazism is dead and former Nazis have been absorbed by the various parties in existence in Western or Eastern Germany. He points out that the present licensed political parties and press denounce all rightest movements as stemming from militarists, imperialists and Nazis, this because they are afraid of a genuine nationalist opposition. He thinks such a nationalist movement could unite, in a single area of political thought, an opposition to the present large parties, denouncing their corruption, mismanagement and dictatorial aims as intolerable.
- d. It follows from the above, he states, that it would be of no value to organize this true nationalist opposition in the form of a political party unless there is prior ideological indoctrination (Meinungsbildung.) First one must have the "ideologie", then the party. (Erst die

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Meinung dann die Partei.) One must practice Realpolitik.
One does not have to be a friend to the United States
(which he implies he is) to know that the presence
of American troops is of the greatest advantage to Germany.
Every sacrifice dedicated to the West, rightly or wrongly,
is worth while if it guarantees security against aggression
from the East.

4. Comment: He knows Communism, he knows the Germans, he
knows psychology and he writes well. But his thinking is recognizable
as being along his former SS lines - he needs a good deal of
indoctrination himself. This is best revealed in his discussion
of East and West German nationalism and his antagonism to licensed
parties and press - without question meaning his distaste for the
SPD and the CDU primarily.

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